The revelations of Snowden show that hardware and software of devices may corrupt users' machine to compromise the security in various ways. To address this concern, Mironov and Stephen-Davidowitz introduce the Cryptographic Reverse Firewall (CRF) concept that is able to resist the ex-filtration of secret information for some compromised machine (Eurocrypt 2015). There are some applications of CRF deployed in many cryptosystems, but less studied and deployed in Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) field, which attracts a wide range of attention and is employed in real-world scenarios (i.e., data sharing in cloud). In this work, we focus how to give a CRF security protection for a multi-authority ABE scheme and hence propose a multi-authority key-policy ABE scheme with CRF (acronym, MA-KP-ABE-CRF), which supports attribute distribution and non-monotonic access structure. To achieve this, beginning with revisiting a MA-KP-ABE with non-trivial combining non-monotonic formula, we then give the randomness of ciphertexts and secret keys with reverse firewall and give formal security analysis. Finally, we give a simulation on our MA-KP-ABE-CRF system based on Charm library whose the experimental results demonstrate practical efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
The revelations of Snowden show that hardware and software of devices may compromise the users' information security in different ways. In the face of an adversary who is likely to arbitrarily tamper with the victim's computer, it is a highly concerned problem that how to enable the encryption protocol to be still secure under this circumstance. To address this concern, Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz [1] introduce the cryptographic reverse firewall (CRF) concept that is able to resist the ex-filtration of secret information for some compromised machines by modifying the messages sent and received. This primitive can be viewed as a modular, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Tony Thomas. which locates between the user's computer and other entities. Recently, Chen et. al., [2] proposed a general CRF modular for several widely used cryptographic protocols and a new scalable smooth projective hash functions for instantiating the oblivious signature-based envelope protocol with CRF. However, there have no such a known uniformed framework to all encryption schema.
Attribute-Based Encryption. Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), an advanced public key encryption notion, attracts a wide range of attention and is employed in realworld scenarios relying on the fine-grained access control over encrpyed data, such as ciphertext cloud storage. This primitive is firstly noted by Sahai and Waters [3] , according to the access policy is whether involved in a secret key or a ciphertext, which is divided into two types: key policy ABE (KP-ABE) [4] - [7] and ciphertext policy ABE (CP-ABE) [8] , [9] . This work focuses on KP-ABE, whose the ciphertext is associated with sets of attributes and the private key of a user is related to an access structure. However in traditional ABE schemes, there is only a single authority who distributes private keys for users in the system.
Once the number of users greatly increases, the efficiency of a single privilege will be obviously reduced, this greatly limits its wide applications. To address this problem, Chase [10] proposed a multi-authority ABE scheme with central authority, which consists of a original central authority (CA) and multiple attribute authorities (AA). In MA-ABE, each user has a global identifier (GID) and sends respective GID to CA for registration and authorization. Note that, the CA does not receive any information about the user's attributes since the CA binds the authorized user's GID to the private key generated by the AAs. The AAs manage their respective attribute sets and generate corresponding a secret key for each authorized user. In 2012, MingLi proposed a data access control mechanism for personal health records and adopted ma-abe to encrypt and protect user's messages. An Yang et al. also proposed an efficient and secure multipermission access control scheme for cloud storage that can support any LSSS access structure.
ABEs with CRFs. However, there are some applications of CRF deployed in many cryptosystems, but less studied and deployed in Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) field, this is because deploying CRF protections on ABE schemes seem to incur some additional costs. Very recently, Ma et al. [11] borrow the online/offline insight and deploy a CRF protection for an online/offline ABE scheme, where three reverse firewall are used to re-randomize variables in generating keys and ciphertexts. They provide an optimization on the online computation efficiency of the reverse firewalls by splitting the computation for the algorithms in ABE into two phases but not a generic method for deploying CRF into ABE system.
However, this idea cannot be directly used in general ABE schemes except online/offline variant. Moreover, as we know, MA-ABE are usually deployed in more real-world application compared to traditional ABE works, but how to provide direct CRF security protections for expressive MA-ABE schemes is still an not unaddressed problem in the field of empowering CRF for ABEs.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTION
Aimed at overcoming the problems, we propose Multi-Authority KP-ABE based on non-monotonic access structure with Cryptographic Reverse Firewalls (MA-KP-ABE-CRF), which not only can solve the access problem of non-monotonic structure in multi-authority, but also maintains the security and resists the exfiltration of secret messages. Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a new ABE scheme with deploying cryptographic reverse firewalls, called MA-KP-ABE-CRF, which can still maintain functions and resist exfiltration of secret information even the ABE implementations are compromised by unexpected attacks. In our construction, some key parameters used in the traditional ABE system are re-randomized by four reverse firewalls to achieve resist ex-filtration and functionality-maintenance.
• Attempts to manage a novel MA-KP-ABE-CRF system that enables attributes distribution, we revisit MA-ABE scheme [12] to implement CRF module and extend to achieve multi-authority property. Moreover, our designed MA-KP-ABE-CRF is designed based on non-monotonic access structure (including AND, OR and NOT access policies), in such a way that the expressiveness of the access control policy is more flexible.
• A formal security analysis is given for the proposed MA-KP-ABE-CRF construction. To illustrate practicality of the system, we conduct well-designed experiments based on Charm-Crypto library, where shows the correctness of the scheme and acceptable efficiency on each reverse firewall and each algorithm in the system.
B. RELATED WORK
With the notion of fuzzy identity-based encryption (Fuzzy-IBE) proposed by Sahai and Waters [3] and attribute encryption introduced by Sahai and Waters [3] and Goyal et al. [4] , recently a number of works have been proposed to focus on the efficiency, constant-size ciphertext/key, attribute revocation, adaptive security and access control strategy [5] , [13] - [17] . However, the original ABE of Sahai and Waters [3] is somewhat limited since it can not be allowed to distribute attributes, hence Chase [10] proposed a multi-authority ABE scheme where there are a central authority (CA) and multiple attribute authorities (AA).
Owing to the revelation of Snowden incident, a new security concern is raised in the field of cryptography: how do we ensure that the proposed scheme is still secure even if the user uses the machine that is malfunctioning or arbitrarily destroyed [18] - [23] . Therefore, Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz [1] introduced the reverse firewall (RF) notion. Such a machine is located between the user's computer and the external world, and when the user proceeds the encryption protocol, it may modify the sent and received messages. There have been some studies on CRF applications in the unkeyed message-transmission protocol and the oblivious signature-based envelope (OSBE) protocol of Blazy et al. [24] . Very recently, Chen [2] proposed a new scalable SPHF for instantiating the OSBE protocol with CRF, as well as a new framework that includes the DDHbased OT-CRF structure proposed by Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz [1] and a new structure generated under the klinear assumption. Ma et al. [11] proposed an online/offline ABE scheme with CRF, which motives this work since none of the previous schemes applied reverse firewall to the multiauthority KP-ABE scheme based on a non-monotonic access structure. 
II. PRELIMINARY
This section introduces some used background knowledge that used in this work.
A. MULTI-AUTHORITY ABE
A Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption scheme consists of five algorithms.
• Setup. The setup algorithm inputs a security parameter, and outputs a system public key and master key for central authority, and a public/secret key pair for each attribute authority.
• Encryption. The encryption algorithm inputs a message m, a set of attributes A u , and the public parameters. It outputs the ciphertext CT .
• Attribute Key Generation. This is a randomized algorithm. On input an access structure A k , the authority's secret key, the public parameters PK , and a user's id. it outputs a secret key for user.
• Central Key Generation. This is a randomized algorithm. On input a secret key, the public parameters PK, and a user's id. it outputs a secret key for user.
• Decryption. This algorithm takes as input the ciphertext CT that was encrypted under a set of attributes A u , the decryption key D for access control structure A k , and the public parameters PK . It outputs the message m if A k u ∈ A k for all authorities k.
B. BILINEAR GROUPS
Definition 1: Assume G, G T are multiplicative cyclic groups of a same prime order p, and e is a efficiently computable bilinear mapping e : G × G → G T , which satisfies: 1) Bilinearity: For all g, h ∈ G, a, b ∈ Z p , we have e(g a , h b ) = e(g, h) ab ; 2) Non-degeneracy: If g 1 , g 2 are generators of G respectively, then e(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1;
C. ACCESS STRUCTURE Definition 2 (Non-monotonic access structure): Let P be the set of parties, for all x ∈ P has two types: positive attribute x and negative attribute x . Let S be a collection of attributes, S denotes a collection of negative attributes in S, S = {x |x ∈ S}. For the monotonic access structure A on the attribute set S, there is a corresponding non-monotonic access structure A = NM (A), which satisfies S ∈ NM (A), while N (S) ∈ A, N (S) contains all the elements in S and negative attributes not included in S element, ie N (S) = S ∪ {x |x ∈ P − S}.
D. LINEAR SECRET-SHARING SCHEMES

Definition 3:
The parties set is P, and the access structure A is represented by (M, ρ), where M is a matrix of l rows and n + 1 columns, and each row of the matrix M represents a party. Let s be a secret value, column vector v = (s, r 1 , · · · , r n ), r 1 , · · · , r n ∈ Z p are randomly chosen. λ i is the secret share value of M i v i-th participant ρ(i). Let the set of parties be S. If S is the authorization set, let I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}, then there is a set of coefficients {µ i } i∈I , making
The relevant definition of the cryptographic reverse firewall is obtained from Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz [1] .
Definition 4 (Cryptographic reverse firewall): A cryptographic reverse firewall(CRF) is a state algorithm W, which takes its state and messages as input and outputs the updated state and messages. For simplicity, we do not write the state of W explicitly. We define W • P as a combination of participants and reverse firewall firewalls, and W is responsible for modifying a party P's incoming and outgoing message. When the composed party engages in a protocol, the state of W is initialized to the public parameters. If W is composed with a party P, then we call it a reverse firewall for P.
Definition 5 (Functionality-maintaining CRFs): For any reverse firewall W and any party P, let W 1
For scheme S that satisfies some functionality F, we say that a reverse firewall W maintain F for P in S if W k • P maintains F for P in S for any polynomial bounded k ≥ 1. When F, P and S is clear, we simply say that W maintains functionality.
Note S P⇒P is the scheme obtained by replacing party P with P in scheme S.
Definition 6 (Weakly security-preserving CRFs): For a scheme S that satisfies some security requirements SR and functionality F and a reverse firewall W. W weakly preserves SR for P in S if the scheme S P⇒W•P satisfies SR for any party P. When SR, P, S and F are clear, we simply say that W weakly preserves security respectively.
Definition 7 (Weakly exfiltration-resistant CRFs): For a scheme S satisfying functionality F and a reverse firewall W. W is weakly exfiltration-resistant for P against corrupted party P 1 in scheme S, if no probailistic polynomial-time adversary A achieves advantage that is non-negligible in the security parameter λ in the game LEAK(S, P, P 1 , W, λ) provided that the output P of an adversary maintains F for P.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY MODEL A. SYSTEM MODEL
As described in Fig.1 , there are a central authorization (CA) in the system and K attribute authorization parties (AA), a private key generation center (PKG), data owners (DO) and data users (DU), along with four reverse firewalls being depoloyed: W PKG is the reverse firewall of PKG, W AA is the reverse firewall of the attribute authority, W CA is the reverse firewall of the central authority, W DO is the reverse firewall of the data owner.
In cloud storage system, the PKG generates the public parameters PK and master secret key MK pair, then sends them to W PKG who rerandomizes PK and MK to generate PK and MK (Setp 1 ). Then CA and AA get the key for user (D CA , D k,u ), W CA and W AA send the updated keys (D CA , D k,u ) to a data user (Step 2 , Step 3 ), and the data owner (DO) generates ciphertext (CT ) after recevied corresponding information (Setp 4 ). After that, the reverse firewall W DO sends the updated ciphertext CT to cloud by Setp 5 and Setp 6 . Finally, the data user get the ciphertext(CT ) from cloud, if the attribute set involved in CT is an authorization set for access policy, the user can recover the message by decrypting the ciphertext(Setp 7 , Setp 8 ).
Let A = A 1 , · · · , A K be a set of attributes and A be an non-monotonic access structure. The multi-authority KP-ABE based on non-monotonic access structure with cryptographic reverse firewalls (MA-KP-ABE-CRF) for access structure space P consists of 11 algorithms: -Setup(λ, U ) → (PK , MK ). The setup algorithm is performed by PKG. On input the security parameter λ general attribute description U , it outputs a system public parameters PK and a master key MK .
-W PKG· Setup(PK , MK ) → (PK , MK ). The algorithm is performed by W PKG . On input PK and MK , it outputs a updated public parameters PK and updated master key MK .
-AASetup(PK , A k C ) → (ask k , apk k ). The algorithm is performed by each attribute authority in the system. On input PK and the attribute set A k C of authority k, it outputs the public-private key pair(apk k , ask k ) for each authority.
-W AA· AASetup(ask k , apk k ) → (ask k , apk k ). The algorithm is performed by W AA . On input (ask k , apk k ) for each attribute authority, it outputs a updated public-private key pair (ask k , apk k ).
-CAKeygen(PK , MK , ask k∈ [K ] , u) → D CA . The algorithm is performed by central authority. On input the update public parameter PK , master key MK , update private key ask k and user's a global identifier (u), it outputs the decryption key D CA of the central authority.
-W CA· CAKeygen(D CA ) → (D CA , τ ). The algorithm is performed by W CA . On input a decryption key D CA of the central authority, it outputs a updated decryption key D CA and a random number τ .
-
The algorithm is performed by each authority k. On input the non-monotonic access structure A k of the authority k and update public parameter PK , it outputs the decryption key D k,u of each user of the attribute authority.
-W AA· AAKeygen(D k,u ) → D k,u . The algorithm is performed by W AA . On input D k,u of each user of the attribute authority k, it outputs a updated decryption key D k,u .
-Encrypt(m, PK , A u ) → CT . The algorithm is performed by DO. On input a message m, a set of attributes A u and the updated public parameter PK , it outputs a ciphertext CT .
-W DO· Encrypt(CT ) → CT . The algorithm is performed by W DO . On input a ciphertext CT , it outputs a updated ciphertext CT .
The algorithm is performed by data user(s). On input a updated ciphertext CT and D k,u of attribute authority k, a updated decryption key D CA and a random number τ , it outputs the message m.
Correctness: For a security parameter λ ∈ N, an attribute universe U , an access structure P and a message m, the correctness holds:
B. SECURITY MODEL
We introduce the selective-set CPA security model for MA-ABE scheme with non-monotonic structure in this section.
Adversarial Model: In the system, the PKG, attribute authorities(AA), central authority(CA), data owner(DO) and data users(DU) are completely trusted; while the public cloud and reverse firewalls W AA , W CA and W DO are semi-honest (''honest and curious'') entities.
Concretely, the Setup algorithm is run by PKG, AAsetup and AAKeygen are run by the attribute authority, and CAKeygen is run by the central authority. The Encrypt is run by the data owner and the Decrypt is run by the data user. The algorithms may be compromised without executor's knowledge, since these algorithms still remain functionality even when they have been implanted with malicious trapdoors. Moreover, the reverse firewall W PKG who can access all secret keys of each user should be completely trusted. In addition, all reverse firewalls are considered to be trusted zones that will not be tampered with by any outsider.
The selective-set CPA security game for MA-KP-ABE-CRF is played by a challenger C and an adversary A.
Init. The adversary A declares a set of attribute authorities (excluding central authority) and the set of attributes A u = A 1 u , · · · , A K u for each authority. The A sends the functionality-maintaining algorithms Setup * , AASetup * , AAKeyGen * , CAKeyGen * and Encrypt * to the challenger C.
Setup: The challenger generates PK of the system and private and public key {ask k , apk k } of attribute authority by running Setup * and AASetup * , then runs W PKG .Setup(PK , MK ) and W AA· AASetup(ask k , apk k ) to get updated PK , then send PK , apk k for all honest authority and the private/public key pairs {ask k , apk k } for all corrupt authority to A.
Phase 1: The A is allowed to adaptively issue queries to the CA or AA. The honest attribute authorities only answers the private key corresponding to the access structure A k that does not satisfy A u (so A u / ∈ A k ). For each query, the challenger C runs AAKeyGen * ( A k , PK ) to obtain D k,u and W AA .AAKeyGen(D k,u ) to get D k,u . Next, Definition 8: A MA-KP-ABE-CRF is selective-set CPAsecure if there is a negligible function negl such that the winning probability of any adversary in the above game is at most 1/2 + negl(λ), that is:
IV. MULTI-AUTHORITY KP-ABE BASED ON NON-MONOTONIC ACCESS STRUCTURE WITH CRYPTOGRAPHIC REVERSE FIREWALLS
In this section, we introduce a basic construction of multiauthority KP-ABE based on non-monotonic access structure (MA-KP-ABE), then introduce a MA-KP-ABE with cryptographic reverse firewalls (MA-KP-ABE-CRF) prove its security in the standard model.
A. BASIC CONSTRUCTION: MA-KP-ABE ACCESS STRUCTURE
Technique Overview. Fristly, because a single authority must be completely trusted and does not meet the needs of distributed applications, thus we use a multi-authority scheme to construct an KP-ABE scheme with non-monotonic access structure. Secondly, the structure of the key and ciphertext in [5] is not fully applicable to the multiauthorization ABE scheme, and can not be rerandomized by reverse firewalls, so we propose basic construction, which is suitable for reverse firewalls. Now, we introduce the details of construction: -Setup(λ, U ) → (PK , MK ). The system setup algorithm selects a bilinear group e : G × G → G T with prime order p, and choose random numbers α 1 , α 2 , b ← Z p , g, h ← G. Let α = α 1 · α 2 , g 1 = g α 1 and g 2 = g α 2 . The public parameter output is as follow: PK = (g, g b , g b 2 , h b , e(g, g) α , H (·)). (where H is a random oracle that outputs elements of the elliptic curve group). The system keeps (α 1 , α 2 , b) as master key MK .
-AASetup(PK , A k C ) → (ask k , apk k ). A k C is a set of the attributes managed by the attribute authority k. Chooes a random value seed k ← Z p as the private key ask k of the attribute authority k, and a random set of d + 1(d is the length of the attribute set A k C ) values {t k,0 , t k,1 , · · · , t k,d } as the public key apk k of attribute authority k, let T k,i = g t k,i .
-CAKeygen(PK , MK , ask k∈ [K ] , u) → D CA . This algorithm outputs the secret key and public key for central authority with the private/public key pairs from each authority. Let α k,u = PRF ask k (u) for each user in central authority, we compute private key for user u in central authority is
, the secret key for central authority: SK CA = (ask k∈[K ] , α 1 ).
-AAKeygen( A k , PK , u) → D k,u . A k is non-monotonic access structures which the authority choose for user. Let α k,u = PRF ask k (u). Assume that the maximum number of row vectors in any access structure corresponding to ciphertext is limited to P. Access structure A k associated with linear secret-sharing matrix (M, ρ) [25] . Let ρ(i) = x i be nonnegated while ρ(i) = x i is negated. Let M l×m be a matrix of l ×m (l ≤ P), select the random vector v = (α k,u , v 2 , · · · , v m ) and calculate λ = (λ 1 , · · · , λ l ) T = M v, where λ i is the shared parameter of α k,u . For every i such that ρ(i) is nonnegated, we have:
for every i such that ρ(i) is negated:
The key D k,u for user u in attribute authority k consists of D i for all shares i.
-Encrypt(m, PK , A u ) → CT . To encrypt message m ∈ G T with attribute set A u = A 1 u · · · A K u , choose random set {s k,i } i∈A k u , let s k = i∈A k u s k,i such that s = K k=1 s k . It sets the ciphertext for ∀k: CT = (A u , C (1) = me(g, g) αs , C (2) = g s ,
is associated with the linear secret sharing scheme (M, ρ). We move from non-monotonic access struct A k to monotonic access strucures
The decryption procedure computes the follows:
For each attribute authority k, we have
For each Z k , we compute
Use the key obtained form central authority to compute Z CA = e(C (2) , Y 0 ) = e(g s , g
Next we can obtain
Finally, the message is obtained by computing
B. CONSTRUCTION OF MA-KP-ABE-CRF Technique Overview. In order to protect PKG, central authority, attribute authority K and data owner, we propose multi-authority KP-ABE based on non-monotonic access with reverse firewall on the basic multi-authorization KP-ABE. In this section, we introduce four reverse firewalls: W PKG (between PKG and other entities), W AA (between attribute authority and other entities), W CA (between central VOLUME 7, 2019 authority and other entities), W DO (between date owner and other entities). They are respectively used for re-random public parameter PK and master key MK of system, attribute authorities secret key D k,u , central authority secret key D CA and ciphertext CT .
-System initialization. PKG runs the Setup(λ, U ) algorithm to generate the system public parameter PK and the master key MK . Before send the system public parameter PK to other entities, PKG will first sends PK , MK to the reverse firewall W PKG .
-W PKG· Setup(PK , MK ) → (PK , MK ). On input the public parameter PK , the reverse firewall W PKG randomly selects a, c,α 1 ,α 2 ,b ∈ Z p , compute g = g a , h = h c , let α 1 = α 1 +α 1 , α 2 = α 2 +α 2 , α = α 1 α 2 , b = b+b, g 1 = g α 1 , g 2 = g α 2 , e(g , g ) α = e(g , g ) α 1 α 2 , and outputs the updated public parameter PK = (g , g b , g b 2 , h b , e(g , g ) α , H (·)) and update master key MK = (α 1 , α 2 , b , h ), send the updated PK to all entities including itself.
The attributes authority k receives the updated public parameter PK and generates the public-private key pairs (ask k , apk k ) of the attributes authority k.
-W AA· AASetup(ask k , apk k ) → (ask k , apk k ). On input public-private key pairs (ask k , apk k ) for attribute authority k, the reverse firewall W AA randomly selectsŝeed k ,
Central authority receives the update public parameter PK , update master key MK and private key ask k∈ [K ] for all attribute authorities and computes D CA = (Y 0 = g α 1 − K k=1 α k,u 2 , {Y k = e(g 2 , g ) α k,u } 1,··· ,K ).
-W CA· CAKeygen(D CA ) → (D CA , τ ). On input D CA from central authority, the W CA chooses a random τ ∈ Z p
Attribute authority runs the AAKeygen( A k , PK ) algorithm and computes D k,u -W AA· AAKeygen(D k,u ) → D k,u . On input D k,u for attribute authority k, for each i, choose a randomr k,i ∈ Z p , output update D k,u as follows:
For every i in attribute authority k, we have:
Date owner runs the Encrypt(m, PK , A u ) → CT and send the ciphertext CT to the reverse firewall W DO . -W DO· Encrypt(CT ) → CT . On input a ciphertext CT , the reverse firewall W DO chooses a random {ŝ k,i } i∈A k u , such thatŝ k = i∈A k uŝ k,i , letŝ = K k=1ŝ k , compute
It sends the update ciphertext
k,i } i∈A k u ,∀k ) to the public cloud. Reciving the decryption request from the data user, the cloud sends the cipertext CT to data user.
Data user runs Decrypt(CT , D k,u , D CA , τ ) → m, computes
Finally, the decryption is obtained by computing:
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS Theorem 1: The proposed MA-KP-ABE-CRF is selectiveset CPA-secure and reverse firewalls for PKG, CA, AAs, data owner maintain functionally, weakly preserve security, and weakly resist exfiltration if the basic structure of MA-KP-ABE in IV-A is selective-set CPA-secure.
Proof: We prove the security of our construction via the following parts.
a: SELECTIVE-SET CPA-SECURE
In our scheme, structure of the user keys D k,u and ciphertext CT is the same as in the article [12] , so the modification does not affect the security proof. In addition, our multiauthority structure defines as [10] , so the security proof is similar to [10] , thus we omit the proof. 
b: FUNCTIONALITY MAINTAINING
The correctness can be easily proved as follows: we obtain D CA from W CA ,
therefore, we have For any tampered implementation on the PKG, the central authority, the attribute authorities, the data owner that maintains functionality, we will prove the selective-set CPA security of our proposed MA-KP-ABE-CRF with tampered algorithms Setup * , AASetup * , CAKeyGen * , AAKeyGen * , Encrypt * by proving the indistinguishability between the security game of MA-KP-ABE-CRF and the security game of the basic construction MA-KP-ABE in IV-A. Additionally, the weak security preservation and weak exfiltration resistance for CRF can be easily proved. Next, we consider the following games: -Game 0. It is identical to the security game of MA-KP-ABE-CRF in III-B.
-Game 1. Same as Game 0 except that during the setup phase, PK , MK are generated by Setup in the basic construction, not Setup * and W PKG· Setup. -Game 2. Same as Game 1 except that during Phase 1 and Phase 2, the secret key D k,u , D CA is generated by AAKeyGen, CAKeyGen in the basic construction, not AAKeyGen * , CAKeyGen * , W AA· AAKeygen, and W CA· CAKeygen.
-Game 3. Same as Game 2 except that during the challenge phase, the challenge ciphertext CT b are generated by Encrypt in the basic construction, not Encrypt * , W DO· Encrypt. Actually, Game 3 is the security game of the basic construction.
Then, the indistinguishability of the paired Game 0 and the Game 1, the Game 1 and the Game 2, the Game 2 and the Game 3 are respectively proved. For paired Game 0 and Game 1, for any falsified algorithm settings, after post-processing of the reverse firewall W PKG , the public parameter PK is uniformly random due to the extensibility of the key, which is the original in the basic structure. The algorithm settings are the same, regardless of the behavior of the settings, so Game 0 and Game 1 are indistinguishable. Since the user key for attribute authority k D k,u and the user key for central authority D CA also have key extensibility, the Game 1 and the Game 2 are indistinguishable. For pair of Game 2 and Game 3, for any tampering algorithm Encrypt * , the updated ciphertext CT will be regenerated uniformly after the post-processing of the reverse firewall W DO , because the ABE scheme and the linear secret sharing scheme can be re-randomized, which is the same as the encryption algorithm in the basic construction, regardless of the behavior of Encrypt * . Therefore, Game 2 and Game 3 are indistinguishable. Therefore, we conclude that Game 0 and Game 3 are indistinguishable. Since the basic structure is selective-set CPA security, the proposed MA-KP-ABE-CRF is selective-set CPA security.
The selective-set CPA security of the MA-KP-ABE-CRF scheme indicates that reverse firewalls for PKG, attribute authorities, central authority and data owner maintain weakly preserve security. The indistinguishability between Game 0 and Game 3 indicates that reverse firewall for PKG, attribute authorities, central authority and data owner maintain weakly resist exfiltration. Combined with all the discussions, we have completed the proof.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section, we conduct a series of experiments to show the practicality of our introduced MA-KP-ABE-CRF, where it is implemented on the experimental development framework Charm-Crypto library (the framework of rapid prototyping advanced cryptography system). The codes are compiled with ''SS512'' super singular curve and performed on a ubuntu 16.04 opeating system with Intel Core (TM) i3-7100 CPU 3.90 Ghz × 4 and 4 GB RAM.
A. EXPERIMENT SETTING
We assume 5 attribute authorities and set the number of attributes for each authority (A k C ) is 100, where the attribute set for each authority is certainly different. An example of an access policy format of a data user is ''(1 and 13) or (24 or 87) and (56 or !74)''. For each authority k, we randomly choose (S k 1 , S k 2 , . . . , S k l ) from A k C as an attribute set A u (defined as ''attribute_U'' in Figures) for data owner to encrypt a message m. To obtain the time costs, for each authority, we set 19 distinct attribute set with l that increases from 5 to 95, and repeat each instance 20 times and take the average value.
B. RUNNING TIME-EFFICIENCY
In Fig.2 , we give the concrete experimental results in detail: Fig.2(a) shows the total time costs of MA-KP-ABE-CRF, while Fig.3(a) shows that the running time of the scheme increases with the number of attributes increases increasing. Fig.2(a) shows the time costs of generating PK , MK and PK , MK repectively for MA-KP-ABE-CRF. Fig.2(c) shows the time costs of generating ask, apk and ask , apk repectively for MA-KP-ABE-CRF. Fig.2(d) shows the time costs of generating D u and D u repectively for attribute authority in MA-KP-ABE-CRF. Fig.2(e) shows the time costs of generating D CA and D CA repectively for MA-KP-ABE-CRF. Fig.2(f) shows the time costs of generating CT and CT repectively for MA-KP-ABE-CRF. Fig.2(g) shows the time costs of generating m repectively for MA-KP-ABE-CRF.
In Fig.3 , we show the total running time-consuming costs of MA-KP-ABE-CRF and MA-KP-ABE in detail: Fig.3(a) illustrates, as the number of attributes increases, the runtime of the scheme also increases. Fig.3(b) shows the time costs of generating PK and MK for MA-KP-ABE and MA-KP-ABE-CRF. Fig.3(c) shows the time costs of generating ask and apk for MA-KP-ABE and MA-KP-ABE-CRF. Fig.3(d) shows the time costs of generating D u for MA-KP-ABE and MA-KP-ABE-CRF. Fig.3(e) shows the time costs of generating D CA for MA-KP-ABE and MA-KP-ABE-CRF. Fig.3(f) shows the time costs of generating CT for MA-KP-ABE and MA-KP-ABE-CRF. Fig.3(g) shows the time costs of generating m for MA-KP-ABE and MA-KP-ABE-CRF.
We note that the conducted experiment shows the correctness of message encryption and message decryption process. Although CRFs are depolyed to our MA-KP-ABE to maintain functions and resist exfiltration of secret information, the time costs occured by invovling are quite acceptable in some extent according to the showed results from the perfomred experiment.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a multi-authority KP-ABE based on non-monotonic access structure with cryptographic reverse firewall, which can maintain functions and resist exfiltration of secret information. In addition, compared with original scheme in [12] , we give a postive answer on the problem of excessive power of single authority and the problem that single authority cannot meet the cooperation of large-scale distributed applications to different organizations. Furthermore, we implemente the introduced MA-KP-ABE-CRF scheme with Charm and verify the practical performance. The future work will focus on how to give further improvement on the efficiency of the scheme.
